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RESPONSIBILITY 
WITHOUT ONTOLOGY: 
A RESPONSE TO GINSBERG 
A. c. Genova 
Robert Ginsberg ("Accounting for Accountability", this journal, 
pp. 1-18, 1990) provides what 1 would characterize as an extended 
dialectical inquiry into a group of related concepts (accountability, 
liability, answerability, re sponsibility) with a view to showing that 
1) these concepts have a common logical behavior and use, 2) all 
necessarily presuppose a normative or moral foundation, 3) all 
have an essentially reflexive or self-referential use in the context of 
human action and society, 4) the forrner three (accountability, 
liability, answerability) aH, to use his phrase, "spring from the 
seminal notion of responsibility", and 5) the organizing principIe 
or ultimate insight into this complex interrelationship -what he 
calls "the heart of the matter"- resides, if 1 understand him, in 
something like a phenomenologicaI apprehension of the "felt 
presence" or "awareness of our existence and coexistence" as 
human beings-the very heart of the morallife and the dialecticaI 
source of responsibility in aH its guises. 
Now there are at least two questions that immediately arise with 
this thesis. The first concerns how Ginsberg manages to move 
from the relatively innocuous notion of accountability from which 
he begins, to his rather dramatic (and therefore more controversiaI, 
1 as sume) conc1usion. This is a question about philosophicaI 
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method and 1 have already said that his method is dialectical. As 
with all good dialecticians, Ginsberg makes liberal use of analogy, 
metaphor and the peculiarly assimilative style of doing philosophy 
that is the trademark of the dialectician. Am 1 wrong about this? 
Well, one thing 1 want to do is to support my contention that we 
are indeed confronted with a di alee tic al argument and to suggest 
that this is why many of Ginsberg's transitions, and especially 
his conclusion, do not appear to embody relations of logical 
entailment-at least when evaluated by a more analytically minded 
philosopher. My point is that if Ginsberg's discussion is not 
dialectical, then 1 would say that the argument is straightforwardly 
invalid; but if it is dialectical as 1 maintain, then although it 
escapes the charge of invalidity, it rests on a major ontological 
presupposition whose acceptability has Httle or nothing to do with 
any argument at aH. This brings me to my second question, viz, is 
there another way of understanding the seminal notion of 
responsibility that does not require or presuppose the acceptance of 
any necessarily moral foundation to the use of this term (or its 
cognates or derivative terms), does not require an underlying 
reflexive use of the term, and does not require or even suggest the 
core phenomenological experience with which Ginsberg closes his 
discussion? 1 think there is, and 1 shall simply suggest the lines 
upon which such an analysis might proceed. 
On the first question, let us briefly examine Ginsberg's method. 
He tells us (p. 1) that we are to reflect upon sorne ordinary senses 
of the word "accountability" in order to "grasp the underlying 
substance of what is involved, for rigorous concepts and c1early 
defined contexts usually grow from a felt sense or rough 
meaning," and that we are to embark on an "informal exploration 
of where notions lead, a searching for the roots that underlie 
deliberate structures". We then are given what 1 take as a very 
uncontroversial colligation of everyday uses of this term, 
exhibiting the more or less linguistic connections among terms like 
"accountability", "giving an account", "accounting", etc., and the 
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application of all this to a variety of contexts, e.g., economic, 
political, military, bureaucratic, academic, journalistic, theological, 
and so on-the idea being, as 1 understand it, that these are 
essentially analogical uses and applications, not really involving 
different univocal meanings in clearly distinguishable contexts. 
The connections are primarily analogical and already suggest or 
forebode something underlying from which the analogues stem. 
Another dialectical move is found on page 3 when Oinsberg says 
that " ... the question of values is already present at the basic 
economic level of the notion". But why? Because with respect to 
his two previously identified standards of rendering accounts in 
economic contexts (viz., accuracy and propriety), the fonner is 
subject to verification, while the latter requires judgment and 
therefore involves values. But why does a judgment concerning 
propriety invoke values in a way that verification does not? Could 1 
not straightforwardly judge whether or not the relevant accounts 
confonn to the pre-established standards or conventions of record-
keeping just as 1 could straightforwardly verify their accuracy? 
Well, if you think not, then you may be a dialectician who 
recognizes a hidden principIe here in accordance with which any 
exercise of judgment is ultimately a value judgment, and moreover, 
any value judgment has a moral ingredient. (Fair enough, but of 
course this is not something that logically follows from anything 
so far said.) 
The emerging principIe is further adumbrated (perhaps 
metaphorically) in claims such as "Ocxi, then, is the final auditor of 
one's books" (p. 5) which is supposed to follow on the basis of 
the immediately preceding point that "the notion of a book of one's 
life is a widespread religious similitude" (my emphasis) which in 
turn followed from the previously drawn analogy between being 
accountable to others and being reflexively accountable to oneself 
when "we bear within our conscience an open account book" (p. 
4). After then drawing analogies between the everyday accoun-
tability he began with, self-accountability, the general social 
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accountability to aH others in our society, and the universal 
reciprocal accountability that obtains for human beings as such, 
Ginsberg personalizes the notion of accountability to the context of 
giving an account of oneself to one's loved ones, and equates this 
(and 1 suppose 1 would agree) with being accountable as a person 
having a continuing identity and a moral self. But then we 
are given a perfectIy general conclusion to the effect that 
"accountability is a moral disposition" (p. 7)-perhaps somewhat 
surprisingly (to the reader) in light of what may have appeared to 
be the purely factual or conventional context with which the 
discussion began. What started as an uncontroversial account of 
the institutional fact of accountability in economic, political, social, 
and similar contexts, is now essentialIy related to a fundamental 
moral disposition. The dichotomy between "is" and "ought" is 
being assimilated before our very eyes in virtue of a yet unstated 
principIe that is gradualIy emerging to the surface awaiting 
discovery by the dialectical participant (the reader). 
1 think 1 have almost said enough to establish the dialectical 
character of Ginsberg's discussion: the connections, for the most 
part, are not made in virtue of the logical analysis of concepts or by 
deductive inference; but rather, are made dialectically on the basis 
of a contextual analysis of analogous instances, all of which makes 
sense only in virtue of the acknowledgment of a synthetic 
(metaphysical?) principIe that once acknowledged or discovered, 
encompasses the diverse instances and licenses their inter-
connection in an organic unity. The principIe has the status of 
reality as opposed to appearance. 
After a great deal of additional discussion in this assimilative 
mode, Ginsberg's principIe finally emerges (is discovered) via a 
phenomenological feeling or awareness -not a linguistic entity, not 
an idea, not a concept or cognition (p. 17)- of what he calls the 
existence and coexistence of the shared humanity within ourselves. 
"Human beings are responsible for discovering their humanity 
within" and the bottom line is that "Responsibility is embedded in 
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such discovery" (p. 18). This is the principIe that underlies and 
provides the dialectical unity for his dialectical matrix for 
responsibility on page 9. As is also common to dialecticians, we 
end with a paradox: Due to the "limitless significance" of this 
discovery (the Sartrean point that any free action has universal 
accountability to aH humanity), we are confronted with the fact that 
what we need to do is, from the standpoint of practical reason, 
impossible-"Unaccountably, we live responsibly and even with 
cheer amid apparent impossibility" (p. 18). Thus, as 1 understand 
Ginsberg, since there is no discursive or rational solution to the 
problem, we need a non-rational solution, the equivalent of the 
existential "leap" found in authors like Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
Kierkegaard, Sartre, Camus, et al.,-what Ginsberg calls an act of 
love. 
Now what significance does this have for someone like me who 
is having difficulty hearing the Heideggerian-like call ("Humanity 
calls, 1 respond") involved here or who cannot fully understand 
(much les s discover) the critical phenomenological experience 
required by Ginsberg's dialectic? What is clear is that for someone 
who is already attuned to this caH of Being--or for someone who is 
predisposed to be dialectically involved in the drift of the 
argument-Ginsberg's result provides a capstone that puts 
everything that he has previously said together into a harmonious 
unity. But of course, the same would be true for a religiously 
inclined person with respect to a quite different result, viz., the 
hypothesis of adivine creator who is the original source of all 
value and who reveals himself in sorne sort of subjective religious 
experience. And of course there appear to be aH sorts of other 
possibilities. AH of them are obviously underdetermined by the 
evidence of linguistic usage of terms like "accountability" and 
"responsibili ty. 11 
One question to Ginsberg then is: Can he provide a dialectical 
argument showing why we should be obliged to accept his 
hypothesis as opposed to others which apparently do the same 
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duty? But my central concern is not one of choosing among such 
hypotheses, but rather, relates to what might be called the 
philosophical force of this kind of dialectical approach. The 
strategy and success of the argument seem to depend on a 
predisposition to, or a presupposiúon of, a non-cognitive principIe 
of unity. To a dialecúcal participant who already (perhaps vaguely 
and even unconsciously) accepts the presupposition or has the 
predisposition, Ginsberg's discussion may indeed make the 
principIe obvious and reinforce the latent existential cornmitment to 
the principIe. But what about the rest of us? A second question 
then is: can Ginsberg provide sorne independent (non-dia/ectical) 
argument for the principie? Otherwise, I am afraid that many of the 
inferences he draws under his dialectical umbrella will appear too 
true to be good (analytic) or too good to be true (false) to those 
who lack the dialectical prerequisites. 
Let us now turn to another approach to the analysis of the 
concept of responsibility. It seems very clear that the notion of 
responsibility (and its variants) pertain primarily to actions. There 
is indeed a secondary (and sornewhat odd) usage of this terrn that 
does not pertain to actions such as found in "What was responsible 
for this rainy weather"? or "What process was responsible for this 
chemical change"? But if this somewhat perverse usage has any 
legitimacy, its significance rests in the fact that it points to a second 
notion that is integralIy connected with its prirnary use, viz., 
causality. If X is responsible for Y, then X must be causal1y 
related to Y. And third, since caused actions cannot occur 
independently of an agent who performs or brings about the 
action, we have the notion of agency. Thus, with respect to the 
philosophical1y interesting notion of the primary usage of 
"responsibility", we can say that there can be no question of 
assigning responsibility in the absence of an agent, or in the 
absence of an event that occurs and is construable as an action, or 
in the absence of sorne sort of causal connection between the 
relevant agent and the relevant action. 
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This picture becomes a bit complex when we take account of 
Ginsberg's correct distinction between "responsibility to" and 
"responsibility for". But rather than proceeding to dialectically 
cOllapse the distinction, 1 think it is more perspicuous to recognize 
that we are dealing here with two relata of a three-place predicate. 
That is to say, ifit is true that X is responsible, then X is typically 
responsible to Y for Z, where X is an agent; Y is sorne persones) 
or institution (where it is possible that X = Y) to which X is 
responsible in virtue of y's authority, position or status, etc.; and 
Z is an action of X (or the action of those for whom X has by a 
previous action taken the responsibility) for which X is responsible 
to Y. Further, 1 think Ginsberg is correct in recognizing that the 
term "responsibility" applies to different contexts; although again, 
rather than analogizing these contexts, 1 think they need to be 
logically distinguished and remain so. These contexts are 
distinguishable on the basis of the norms, standard s or criteria for 
responsibility which govern the assessment of responsibility 
relative to each context. There are, in general, three logically 
distinct contexts employing respectively logically distinct 
standards. 
The due as to what these are is suggested by the longstanding 
distinction between what has been called sociological juris-
prudence, formal jurisprudence, and ethical jurisprudence-three 
different kinds of contexts for evaluating and justifying alternative 
courses of action. Let us run through a brief example in all three 
contexts. Consider the American debate of the sixties concerning 
the appropriateness or inappropriateness of instituting racial 
integration in public schools. On one level, there were argurnents 
both for and against integration on the purely de facto basis that the 
opposite course of action (as the case may be) simply would not 
work. "We ought to integrate the schools because if we don't, 
there will be a social revolution by minorities" or "We ought to 
keep the schools segregated, because if we don't, we will be 
futilely trying to impose something on the majority for which it is 
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not ready". On another level, there were pro and con arguments 
based on purely de jure considerations that invoked legal precedent 
to support either side, as the case may be. And finally, there were 
pro and con arguments based on moral considerations alone, e.g. 
there were those who supported integration and those who 
opposed it on the basis of their respective interpretations of the 
Bible or scriptures. Now there is no necessary logical connection 
between sociological justification based on de jacto or pragmatic 
considerations, formal justification grounded on legal precedents, 
and ethical justification rooted in moral principIes. A positivist like 
Hobbes would give priority to de jacto considerations and then 
ground legal or moral determinations on the self-interested act of 
social contract; a naturallaw theorist typically gives priority to an 
objective ethical domain and then requires that positive law 
conform to morallaw; and a strict conventionalist might construe 
all standards and norms as deriving ultimately from legal 
conventions; and still others may conceivably abjure any attempt at 
reductionism in any direction, and treat the three contexts as 
yielding competitive justifications that require adjudication on a 
case by case basis. Now in terms of the complex concept of 
responsibility, I would contend that these three contexts, as such, 
yield three senses of responsibility-legal responsibility, moral 
responsibility, and de jacto responsibility. 
The last notion may seem least intuitive: How can someone be 
he Id de jacto responsible for his actions independendy of legal or 
moral considerations? Well, it can happen that we hold a person 
responsible for his actions without holding him legalIy culpable or 
morally blameworthy. Suppose, prior to certain, major legal 
actions in the courts, concerning civil rights, the Govemor held 
fast to a policy of segregation under the banner of "separate but 
equal"; and suppose that the white citizens of the state found the 
Governor's position morally acceptable; then suppose this policy 
resulted in race riots, social disruption, etc. In response to the 
question "Who was responsible for this"? it might well be 
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responded "The Governor" without any suggestion of legal or 
moral accountability. This sense of de jacto responsibility is 
somewhat similar to the secondary sense of "responsibility" with 
which I began: If X caused Y, then X is responsible for Y, de 
jacto. 
At any rate, the general upshot is that for a typical case of 
responsibility, if it is true to say that X is responsible, then X is an 
agent; X is responsible to Y for Z, where Y is sorne agent or 
institutional agency (and X = Y in the special reflexive case of 
responsibility to oneself); and Z is an action that in sorne relevant 
sense is causally related to X; and Rxyz occurs in come context e, 
where e is a legal or moral context containing the constitutive 
standards or criteria for the assessment of responsibility. (De jacto 
cases are not typical because they do not involve the relation of 
"responsibility to"). 
Let us briefly focus on moral responsibility, because it is this 
context that is especially important to philosophy of mind and 
action-theory. It is in this context-the context of moral or personal 
responsibility-that we are inclined to say that not only are the 
regulated consequences of responsible action justijied (con se-
quences like punishment, liability, retribution, reward, praise, 
blame, etc.) but also that the responsible agent deserves the 
consequences. In other words, moral or personal responsibility is 
typically treated as a necessary condition for the deserving of 
various forms of praise or blame-for the agent's being 
blameworthy or praiseworthy. One could be justifiably held to be 
legally responsible for an action, but not be considered personal1y 
blameworthy or praiseworthy. If one is also judged to be 
deserving of praise or blame for a particular action or its 
consequences, then one is being judged as moral1y accountable in 
the context of moral criteria that characterize the so-called moral 
point of view. Now moral responsibility may (perhaps almost 
always does) constitute an aspect of legal responsibility as well. 
Some laws are obviously derived from or grounded on universally 
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acknowledged moral principIes (e.g. laws against murder, 
stealing, etc.); and others, although only having the conventional 
status of positive law (e.g., traffic laws) admit of degrees of 
culpability depending upon the degree of moral intent involved; 
and still others ascribe legal responsibility quite independentIy of 
any considerations of motive or intent, e.g., in statutes involving 
"strict liability" and perhaps where "ignorance of the law is no 
excuse. "1 may be he Id legally responsible with respect to 
someone's falling down my front steps or being struck by a loose 
roof shingle, without any intentional action on my part except for 
the act of purchasing my home ten years ago. And conversely, I 
may be held morally responsible for an action even though 1 am 
legally in the clear. The problem, then, is the following: what is it 
that makes an agent or an action deserving of praise or blame? Or 
better, what is it that makes an action a rrwrally relevant action for 
which one can be held morally responsible? 
Sorne philosophers have claimed that A is morally responsible 
for X iff 1) A did X or brought X about, and 2) A acted freely. 
This scheme is not very helpful because it is not c1ear what "A did 
X" means, and such locutions as "A did X freely" are notorious 
for their ambiguity. A can do X when X is not an action at all. For 
example, if A slipped on a banana peel, it is correct to say that that 
is something A did, but not that this was an action of A's. Further, 
to say that only free actions are morally relevant sounds right, but 
it is fraught with well-known metaphysical difficulties concerning 
freedom vs. determinism, and often suggests a Cartesian sense of 
agency that need not (1 contend) be presupposed in order to 
understand our use of an expression like "moral responsibility". 
1 think that a profitable line to pursue here is one suggested by 
Donald Davidson in papers like "Agency", "Reasons, Actions and 
Causes", and "Freedom to Act" (Essays on Actions & Events, 
Oxford, 1980). For Davidson, a primary criterion for genuine 
agency or action is intentionality. That is to say, every action is 
intentional under sorne description or other. So what we correct1y 
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characterize as an unintentional action is also an intentional action 
under another description. An action is straightforwardly a spatio-
temporal event. What makes an event an action is the fact that there 
is sorne true description of the event that makes true an assertion 
that an agent did it intentionally under that description. Thus, 
intentionality is a sufficient condition for agency (or action) but not 
a necessary condition for a particular action under a given 
description; because with respect to a particular action under a 
given true description, we can have agency (and therefore action) 
without intentionality when the agent does not intentionally 
perform that action under the given description but performs it 
intentionally under a different description. So we have three 
possibilities for Davidson: 1) there are events which can be 
correctIy characterized as doings, which are not action because 
they are not intended, e.g., when 1 spill my coffee on your dress 
because someone collided with my elbow; 2) there are non-
intentional actions, e.g., when 1 intentionally spill the contents of 
my cup on your dress, thinking it is tea when it is actually coffee, 
then spilling the coffee is a non-intentional action; and 3) there are 
intentional actions, e.g., when 1 spill the coffee on your dress 
intentionally ("Agency", p. 45). 
Now, in my general sketch of the schema of responsibility, the 
proviso that the responsible action must "in sorne relevant sense" 
be causally related to the agent, needs clarification as this applies to 
the context of moral responsibility. The relevant sense of causality 
here cannot be that of event-causality, i.e., the causal relations that 
hold between particular actions/events. As Davidson shows 
("Agency", pp. 49-52), we cannot say that all actions are caused 
by prior actions this way because if we did, then we would be 
confronted with an infinite regress of acts. We must instead say 
that aH the consequences or effects of actions (including all their 
true redescriptions) proceed in accordance with event-causality, but 
not that the original actions (the bodily movements he calls 
"primitive actions") are in turn caused similarly by the agent. So 
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sorne events must be "primitive actions" in the sen se that they do 
not admit of analysis in terms of causal relations to other actions of 
the agent. What "relevant sense" of causality can possibly be 
involved then, between a responsible agent and a primitive action? 
The answer lies in Davidson's notion of agent-causality wherein 
the cause of an action is construed as the reason for an action, Le. 
the states of belief and desire that rationalize the given action. 
These mental states are not thernselves actions, but rather, their 
proposi tional expressions " ... provide an account of the reasons the 
agent had in acting, and allow us to reconstruct the intentíon with 
whích he acted" ("Freedorn to Act," p. 72). The idea here is that 
Davidson lands on an acceptable interpretation of agent-causality 
by providing an analysis of intention in terms of causality: If A 
does X intentionally, then A's doing X is caused by A's 
propositional attitudes that rationalize X. 
In ihis context, "freedom" is c10sely tied to what can be done 
intentionalIy, Le., if we assume there are no "wayward causal 
chains" that intervene, to say that A is free to do X is to say that A 
would do X intentionally if A had the appropriate attitudes that 
rationalized A's doing X (p. 79). As I understand this, this 
construal of freedom to act as a "causal power of the agent", means 
that A is free to do what A can do intentionally in accordance with 
an appropriate reason; but this does not entail that all free action is 
intentional with respect to a given true description of the action, 
Le. although the spilling the contents of rny cup is intentional (and 
free) under that description, it is not intentional (but is still free) 
under the aIterative description of the action as a spilling of my 
coffee (when I thought it was tea). Thus, the notion of 
intentionality is more cornplex than that of freedorn. As Davidson 
says, "What an agent does do intentionalIy is what he is free to do 
and has adequate reasons for doing" (p. 74). 
I can now bring rny point home: What rnakes an action X under 
a description D morally relevant and therefore subject to moral 
responsibility is that 1) A did X intentionally under description D, 
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2) A had the appropriate attitudes (desires, beliefs) that rationalize 
the action under D, and 3) A did X because A had the 
rationalization (the relevant reason is the reason why A did X). 
Such actions are candidates for moral assessment, and any 
consequences that accrue to such actions (praise, blame, 
punishment, reward) are not only warranted in light of any pre-
established norms there may be, but are deserved by the agent 
responsible. Thus, it seems to me that we can understand the 
notion of "responsibility" and even "moral responsibility" without 
presupposing or implying any significant commitment to a 
metaphysical principIe, an unique phenomenological inner expe-
rience, or any specific moral doctrine. 
